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Companies often obtain “non-infringement” or “invalidity” opinions before they engage 
in any activity to have assurance that they will not be violating any one else’s patent rights. A 
company’s reliance (or lack thereof) on non-infringement and invalidity opinions is an important 
factor that courts will consider when they are assessing whether to levy “enhanced” or “punitive” 
damages against an infringer. If the infringer obtained legal advice that their activity would not 
be infringing, the infringer will be less likely to be assessed with enhanced damages. An ethical 
consideration arises when an attorney drafts a non-infringement or invalidity opinion and then 
later represents the same client in defense of a patent infringement lawsuit for activity that the 
attorney opined would be non-infringing. Opposing counsel will sometimes move to disqualify 
the attorney as a necessary witness claiming that he is required to testify about the circumstances 
surrounding how he provided the client with the opinion. Courts have reached differing 
conclusions regarding whether opinion counsel can also serve as trial counsel.   
This paper examines whether an opinion-drafting attorney is a necessary witness under 
the standards set forth by the Federal Circuit for willful infringement.  This paper will examine 
the previous standard, as set forth by the Underwater Devices case and its progeny, as well as the 
more recent standard set forth by the Federal Circuit in 2007 in In re Seagate. Lastly, this paper 
examines what relevant evidence an opinion-drafting attorney may testify about in light of the 
Federal Circuit’s recent limitation on the waiver of attorney work product protections in an 
advice of counsel defense and whether that information is obtainable from another source.  
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A. Willful Infringement Claims and Defense of Reliance on Advice of Counsel 
 
Congress has provided that “court[s] may increase the damages up to three times the 
amount found or assessed [for patent infringement].”1 Courts have long held, however, that these 
treble damages are only available when the patent holder is able to prove that the defendant 
willfully infringed the patent holder’s patent.2 Parties accused of willful infringement often raise 
the defense of reliance on advice of counsel of non-infringement or patent invalidity to show that 
their actions were reasonable and not willful.3 While reliance on a non-infringement or invalidity 
opinion is not dispositive of willfulness, it is a “crucial” factor to be considered in any 
willfulness analysis.4 
B. Ethical Considerations of Disqualifying an Opinion-Drafting Attorney as a 
Necessary Witness 
 
An ethical issue arises when an attorney drafts a non-infringement opinion for a client 
and later represents that client at a trial in defense of a willful infringement claim regarding the 
client’s conduct based on the non-infringement opinion.5 Patent holders often attempt to 
disqualify the opinion-drafting attorney from representing the defendant at trial, claiming that the 
opinion-drafting attorney is likely to testify.6 Both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(2003) (“Model Rules”) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1969) (“Model 
                                                 
1 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).  
2 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
3 Id. at 1369.  
4 Id. (citing Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Scis., Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).   
5 See Crossroad Sys. (Texas), Inc. v. Dot Hill Sys. Corp., No. A-03-CA-754-SS, 2006 WL 1544621, at *9-11 (W.D. 
Tex. May 31, 2006); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833 (RPP), 2000 WL 
1655054, at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2000); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Lonza, Inc., No. Civ. A. 96-5732, 1999 WL 
718114, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 1999); Liqui-Box Corp v. Reid Valve Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1074, 1075 (W.D. Pa. 
1989); Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Nat’l Castings, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1737, 1741-42 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Ristvedt-Johnson, 
Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., No. 88 C 3834, 1990 WL 114732, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 1990). 
6 See id. 
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Code”) address the disqualification of a trial attorney who also acts as a witness during trial.7 
Rule 3.7 of the Model Rules provides:8  
(a)  A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer 
is likely to be a necessary witness unless: 
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal 
services rendered in the case; or 
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial 
hardship on the client. 
(b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer 
in the lawyer's firm is likely to be called as a witness unless 
precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9. 
 
Likewise, disciplinary rule 5-102 of the Model Code provides:9 
(B) A lawyer shall not accept employment in contemplated or 
pending litigation if he knows or it is obvious that he or a 
lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a witness, except that 
he may undertake the employment and he or a lawyer in his 
firm may testify: 
(1) If the testimony will relate solely to an uncontested 
matter. 
(2) If the testimony will relate solely to a matter of 
formality and there is no reason to believe that 
substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to the 
testimony. 
(3) If the testimony will relate solely to the nature and 
value of legal services rendered in the case by the 
lawyer or his firm to the client. 
(4) As to any matter, if refusal would work a substantial 
hardship on the client because of the distinctive value 
of the lawyer or his firm as counsel in the particular 
case. 
 
While these rules are not identical, they do “speak with one voice.”10 The one notable difference 
between the Model Rules and the Model Code is that the Model Code imputes disqualification to 
                                                 
7 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.7 (2003); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101, 5-102 
(1969) (emphasis added).  
8 R. 3.7 (emphasis added). 
9 DR 5-101(B) (emphasis added). 
10 Crossroad Sys. (Texas), Inc. v. Dot Hill Sys. Corp., No. A-03-CA-754-SS, 2006 WL 1544621, at *10 (W.D. Tex. 
May 31, 2006). 
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the attorney’s firm while the Model Rules do not.11 Nevertheless, Model Rule 3.7 and 
Disciplinary Rule 5-102 preclude an attorney from representing a client when that attorney is a 
“necessary witness” or “ought to be called as a witness,” respectively.12 
 For purposes of this paper the relevant question becomes: “When is an opinion-drafting 
attorney a necessary witness or ought to be called as a witness during an infringement trial?” 
Courts have generally held that an attorney is a necessary witness or ought to be called as a 
witness if the attorney “[1] will give evidence material to the determination of the issues being 
litigated, [2] that the evidence is unobtainable elsewhere, and [3] that the testimony is or may be 
prejudicial to the testifying attorney's client.”13 Whether evidence is “material” to the 
determination of willful infringement will depend on the substantive law of willful infringement 
as set forth by the Federal Circuit. The following sections propose that opinion-drafting attorneys 
cannot provide testimony that is material to the determination of a client’s willfulness because 
the willfulness standard as set forth by the Federal Circuit is only dependent on the defendant’s 
conduct, beliefs, and state of mind, and not the attorney’s.  Further, even if the attorney may 
provide material evidence, it is most likely obtainable from another source since the only 
discoverable information is communications between the attorney and client which the client will 
be able to testify about. The end result is that an opinion-drafting attorney is not a “necessary 
witness” nor “ought to be called as a witness” and, therefore, cannot be disqualified from 
representing a client at trial unless the case presents extreme circumstances absent from a normal 
case.     
                                                 
11 Id. 
12 R. 3.7; DR 5-101.   
13 Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Int’l Ins. Co., 881 P.2d 1020, 1033 (Wash. 1994) (discussing R. 3.7); accord Personalized 
Mass Media Corp. v. Weather Channel, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 239, 243 (E.D. Va. 1995) (discussing DR 5-102; 
Cottonwood Estates, Inc. v. Paradise Builders, Inc., 624 P.2d 296, 302 (Ariz. 1981) (discussing DR 5-102).  See 
also George M. Sirilla et al., Advice of Counsel-Defense or Dilemma? Friend or Foe?, 81 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. 
Soc’y 376, 381(May 1999) (“A lawyer is a ‘necessary witness’ when the testimony is relevant, material and 
unobtainable elsewhere.”) (citations omitted).   
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II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT HAS ESTABLISHED A WILLFUL 
INFRINGEMENT STANDARD WHICH DETERMINES WHETHER AN 
ATTORNEY’S TESTIMONY IS MATERIAL TO THE ISSUES BEING 
LITIGATED 
 
The Federal Circuit has held that “Federal Circuit law applies when deciding whether 
particular written or other materials are discoverable in a patent case, if those materials relate to 
an issue of substantive patent law.”14 Furthermore, “questions of . . . discoverability that arise 
from assertions of the advice-of-counsel defense necessarily involve issues of substantive patent 
law.”15 As such, the standard for willful infringement as set forth by the Federal Circuit will 
determine whether an opinion-drafting attorney is a necessary witness or ought to be called as a 
witness during a willful infringement trial.   
The Federal Circuit first established a standard for willful infringement in 1983 in the 
Underwater Devices case.16 Following the Underwater Devices standard, the district courts often 
reached differing conclusions about whether an opinion-drafting attorney is a necessary witness 
at trial (although the courts did not always apply the Underwater Devices standard).17 In 2007 
the Federal Circuit overruled the Underwater Devices standard in the case of Seagate.18 In 
clarifying the willful infringement standard in Seagate, the Federal Circuit has provided an 
opportunity for district courts to provide consistent rulings regarding whether an opinion-drafting 
attorney should be disqualified from representing the same client at trial. The following section 
will examine the Underwater Devices standard and disqualification cases arising under that 
                                                 
14 Advanced Cardiovascular Sys. v. Medtronic, Inc., 265 F.3d 1294, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  
15 In re Echostar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, 
Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 803-04 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  
16 Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983).   
17 See David Hricik, An Opinion of Counsel from Trial Counsel: A Handful of Sand?, 35 AIPLA Q.J. 171, 174 
(Spring 2007) (“The courts are split over whether disqualification under the advocate-as-witness rule is required 
when a lawyer combines the roles [of opinion counsel and litigation counsel].”). 
18 In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
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standard and then propose a uniform application of the Seagate standard to disqualification of 
patent drafting attorneys.   
A. The Federal Circuit’s Underwater Devices Standard  
The Federal Circuit established the standard for willful infringement early, stating that a 
potential infringer has “an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether he is 
infringing.”19 Moreover, that affirmative duty required the potential infringer to “seek and obtain 
competent legal advice from counsel before the initiation of any possible infringing activity.”20 
This standard evolved over time into an evaluation of “all the circumstances” with a list of nine 
relevant factors.21 Ultimately, the court stated that “[t]he paramount determination in deciding to 
grant enhancement and the amount thereof is the egregiousness of the defendant's conduct based 
on all the facts and circumstances.”22  
Placing an affirmative duty upon potential infringers to obtain a “competent” legal 
opinion and evaluation of “all the facts” led to two noted and unintended consequences: (1) the 
Federal Circuit held that “an accused infringer’s failure to produce advice from counsel ‘would 
warrant the conclusion that it either obtained no advice of counsel or did so and was advised that 
its activities would be an infringement;’” and (2) if a non-infringement opinion was relied on as a 
defense, the attorney-client privilege and work product protections were waived in their 
                                                 
19 Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1389-90 (citations omitted).  
20 Id.  
21 Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1369 (citing Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826-27 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). The nine-
factor test includes: “(1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of another; (2) whether the 
infringer, when he knew of the other's patent protection, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith 
belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed; (3) the infringer's behavior as a party to the litigation; (4) 
defendant's size and financial condition; (5) closeness of the case; (6) duration of defendant's misconduct; (7) 
remedial action by the defendant; (8) defendant's motivation for harm; (9) whether defendant attempted to conceal 
its misconduct.” Read Corp. 970 F.2d at 826-27 (citations omitted). Notably, the nine-factor test does not include an 
examination of the opinion-drafting attorney’s competence or state of mind. See id. generally.   
22 Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 826. 
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entirety.23 Another unintended consequence of examining “all the facts” and requiring that a 
“competent” legal opinion be obtained is that opinion-drafting attorneys are often unnecessarily 
called as a witness. As the following cases show, requiring a “competent” legal opinion to be 
obtained and examining “all the facts” led to inconsistent and unpredictable results among the 
district courts regarding whether it was necessary to disqualify an opinion-drafting attorney.24   
1. Cases Holding Opinion-Drafting Attorneys Are Not Necessary Witnesses  
 
Cases that have refused to disqualify an attorney have generally noted that 
disqualification of an attorney is a drastic remedy which is granted infrequently.25 Moreover, 
these cases explicitly relied on the standard set forth in Underwater Devices and its progeny and 
held that the relevant inquiry is only into the behavior and state of mind of the client, and not the 
conduct or competency of the attorney.26 
a. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhône-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. 
In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhône-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., the Southern District of New 
York held that an opinion-drafting attorney was not a necessary witness.27 In this case, the patent 
holder moved to disqualify the opinion-drafting attorney because it claimed that when the 
defendant raised the advice of counsel defense, they would be introducing the opinion as 
                                                 
23 Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370. The Federal Circuit overruled (1) the adverse inference Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer 
Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2004); and (2) limited the waiver of the 
work product protection in 2006 in In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1303-04 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
24 See generally Crossroad Sys. (Texas), Inc. v. Dot Hill Sys. Corp., No. A-03-CA-754-SS, 2006 WL 1544621, at 
*9-11 (W.D. Tex. May 31, 2006); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833 (RPP), 
2000 WL 1655054, at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2000); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Lonza, Inc., No. Civ. A. 96-5732, 1999 
WL 718114, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 1999); Liqui-Box Corp v. Reid Valve Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1074, 1075 (W.D. Pa. 
1989); Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Nat’l Castings, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1737, 1741-42 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Ristvedt-Johnson, 
Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., No. 88 C 3834, 1990 WL 114732, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 1990).. 
25 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833 (RPP), 2000 WL 1655054, at *2-4 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2000); Ristvedt-Johnson, Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., No. 88 C 3834, 1990 WL 114732, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 
July 25, 1990); Liqui-Box Corp v. Reid Valve Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1074, 1075 (W.D. Pa. 1989). 
26 See generally id.  
27 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhône-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833 (RPP), 2000 WL 1655054, at *2-4 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2000). 
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testimony.28 The court, after citing the progeny of Underwater Devices, held that the opinion 
letter was not testimonial because “[a]s a matter of law, whether the opinion letter is a correct 
analysis of the issues it addressed is not the relevant issue for the jury; rather the issues will be 
(1) whether [the defendant] received and exercised due care in relying on a legal opinion, and (2) 
whether that legal opinion appears to be competent.”29 Even if the opinion-drafting attorney’s 
testimony was necessary, it still would not warrant disqualification because the fact that the 
attorney communicated the opinion to the client would not be contested and the attorney would 
therefore be excepted from disqualification under DR 5-102(B)(1).30  
The court concluded that there was no need to call the opinion-drafting attorney to the 
stand because the letter could be admitted through the recipient of the letter and the competency 
of the letter could be determined by examining the four-corners of the document.31 The court 
further noted, “the opinion letter should be reviewed for its overall tone, its discussion of case 
law, its analysis of the particular facts and its reference to inequitable conduct [by the patent 
holder’s attorney].”32 The court stated that the opinion letter was competent “on its face” and 
refused to disqualify the attorney.33 Thus, the relevant inquiry was not into the opinion-drafting 
attorney’s state of mind, competency, or conduct.   
b. Liqui-Box Corp. v. Reid Valve Co. 
In Liqui-Box Corp. v. Reid Valve Co., the Western District of Pennsylvania held that an 
opinion-drafting attorney was not a necessary witness and therefore could not be disqualified.34 
                                                 
28 Id. at 2.  
29 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Ortho Pharm. Corp., 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).  
30 Id. DR 5-102(B) provides that “A lawyer shall not accept employment . . . [if he] ought to be called as a witness, 
except that he may undertake the employment if the testimony will relate solely to an uncontested matter.” 
31 Id. at 3. 
32 Id. (citing Westvaco Corp. v. Int’l Paper, 991 F.2d 735, 743-44 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
33 Id. 
34 Liqui-Box Corp v. Reid Valve Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1074, 1075 (W.D. Pa. 1989). 
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In reaching this conclusion the court explicitly relied on the Underwater Devices case.35 The 
court reasoned that “Underwater Devices speaks in terms of the opinion as reflected on the four 
corners of the document. Good faith reliance by a party on counsel’s opinion is a question of the 
party’s state of mind, not the state of mind of the counsel.”36  
The court continued, “the [advice of counsel] defense does not require an inquiry into the 
counsel’s state of mind.”37 The court further noted that “[m]atters held to be relevant inquiries 
into the competence of counsel’s opinion of non-infringement include whether counsel examined 
the file history of the patents, whether the opinion came from in-house or outside counsel, 
whether there was a pattern of attorney shopping by the alleged infringer, and whether the 
opinion came form a patent attorney.”38 The court concluded generally, “where evidence is 
available from other sources and absent extraordinary circumstances or compelling reasons, an 
attorney who participates in a case should not be called as a witness.”39 Thus, the reasonableness 
of reliance on the opinion can be determined from the face of the document itself or readily 
verifiable information and does not require an inquiry into the competency of the attorney.   
c. Ristvedt-Johnson, Inc. v. Brandt, Inc. 
In Ristvedt-Johnson, Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., the Northern District of Illinois held that an 
opinion-drafting attorney was not a necessary witness and would not be disqualified.40 While the 
plaintiff wished to call the opinion-drafting attorneys as witnesses, the defendant asserted that in 
relying on the advice of counsel defense they would not be calling any of the opinion-drafting 
                                                 
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
37 Id. (citing Machinery Corp. of Am. v. Gullfiber AB, 774 F.2d 467, 472-73 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).  
38 Id. (citing Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1390; Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 788 F.2d 1554, 
1559 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).  
39 Id.  
40 Ristvedt-Johnson, Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., 1990 WL 114732, at *3. 
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attorneys as witnesses.41 Rather, the defendant intended to make out its defense through the 
“testimony of the individuals who solicited and received the opinions.”42  
The court further noted that DR 5-102 requires that the testimony of the attorney, if he 
were required to testify, be prejudicial to the client.43 In this case, if the attorney were to be 
called as a witness his testimony would only be limited to whether an opinion was sought and 
offered rather than the validity of the opinion itself.44 As a result, the attorney’s testimony was 
not likely to be prejudicial to the client.45 
d. Cases Holding that the Opinion-Drafting Attorney was Not a Necessary 
Witness Correctly Applied the Underwater Devices Standard. 
 
The Bristol-Myers Squibb, Liqui-Box, and Ristvedt-Johnson cases all turned to the 
Federal Circuit for guidance on whether an attorney would be a “necessary witness” during a 
willful infringement trial.46 In relying on the Underwater Devices standard for willful 
infringement, the courts correctly limited the inquiry into the defendant’s conduct and state of 
mind rather than the attorney’s. These courts also adhered to the notion that it is a drastic remedy 
to disqualify an attorney and that disqualification should only occur if the attorney has relevant 
information that is unobtainable from any other source.47 While these courts did properly apply 
the Underwater Devices standard for willful infringement, other courts allowed inquiries into the 
opinion-drafting attorney’s conduct and state of mind.48  
                                                 
41 Id. 
42 Id.  
43 Id. 
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
46 See generally Bristol-Myers Squibb, 2000 WL 1655054; Ristvedt-Johnson, 1990 WL 114732; Liqui-Box, 16 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1074. 
47 Id.  
48 See Crossroad Sys. (Texas), Inc. v. Dot Hill Sys. Corp., No. A-03-CA-754-SS, 2006 WL 1544621, at *9-11 (W.D. 
Tex. May 31, 2006); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Lonza, Inc., No. Civ. A. 96-5732, 1999 WL 718114, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 
7, 1999); Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Nat’l Castings, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1737, 1741-42 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
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2. Cases Holding that An Opinion-drafting Attorney Was A Necessary Witness and 
Subject to Disqualification. 
 
Courts that have granted disqualification of an opinion-drafting attorney have done so on 
the basis that defense counsel must testify about their “qualifications and objectivity,”49 
“credibility and legal acumen,”50 or the client’s withholding of information from the opinion-
drafting attorney.51 Notably, these cases either did not reference any standard for willful 
infringement set by the Federal Circuit52 or found that the exceptional circumstances existed to 
allow an inquiry into the attorney’s conduct.53  
a. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Lonza, Inc. 
In the case of Rohm & Haas Co. v. Lonza, the court disqualified an opinion-drafting 
attorney from representing a client during an infringement trial because the attorney’s 
“qualifications and objectivity” would be called into question as it related to his non-
infringement opinion.54 The court rested its decision upon Rule 3.7.55 The court elaborated that 
the written opinion was “testimonial” and that the attorney, as trial counsel, “would be urging the 
jury to credit the fact that they had submitted their opinions to defendants and to some extent, 
arguably, to accept the contents of those opinions.”56 The court did not cite to the Federal Circuit 
for a willful infringement standard (or any other circuit for that matter).57 Rather, in a brief 
decision, the court relied on the plaintiff’s assertion that it “intends to call [the opinion-drafting 
attorneys] to testify about their qualifications and objectivity as relates to their opinions.”58 
                                                 
49 Rohm & Haas Co. v. Lonza, Inc., 1999 WL 718114, at *1. 
50 Crossroad Sys. (Texas), 2006 WL 1544621, at *9-11. 
51 Amsted Indus., 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1741-42. 
52 See Crossroad Sys. (Texas), 2006 WL 1544621, at *9-11; Rohm & Haas, 1999 WL 718114, at *1.  
53 Amsted Indus., 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1741-42. 
54 Rohm & Haas Co. v. Lonza, Inc., No. Civ. A. 96-5732, 1999 WL 718114, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 1999). 
55 Id. 
56 Id.  
57 See id. generally.  
58 Id.  
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Allowing an inquiry into the objectivity of the attorney is inconsistent with the standard set forth 
by Underwater Devices, which states that only the client’s conduct is relevant. 
b. Crossroad Systems (Texas), Inc. v. Dot Hill Sys. Corp.  
In the case of Crossroad Systems (Texas), Inc. v. Dot Hill Sys. Corp., the court not only 
disqualified three opinion-drafting attorneys from representing their client during an 
infringement trial, the court disqualified their entire law firm from representing the client.59 In 
the Crossroad case, the court stated that the attorneys were governed by four separate ethical 
canons: the local rules of the district court; the Model Rules; the Model Code; and the rules of 
professional conduct of Texas.60 The court noted that all four of these ethical canons “speak with 
one voice” so the court never explicitly identified which rule it was relying on to disqualify the 
opinion-drafting attorney.61 In reaching its disqualification conclusion, the court reasoned that 
“[the patent holder] will be seeking to attack the reasonableness of [the infringer’s] reliance on 
the opinions given by [counsel], in part, by attacking the accuracy and validity of the opinions 
themselves as well as the work underlying the formulation of the opinions.”62 Moreover, the 
“credibility and legal acumen” of the opinion-drafting attorneys would be called into question.63  
In disqualifying the entire firm, the court was concerned that trial counsel would be 
required to vouch for the credibility and reliability of the disqualified opinion-drafting attorneys 
who were testifying and that this may ultimately produce a conflict of interest between the law 
firm and the client.64 It is also noteworthy that court was not concerned with any hardship placed 
upon the client because the client and its counsel had been warned of the potential for 
                                                 
59 Crossroad Sys. (Texas), Inc. v. Dot Hill Sys. Corp., No. A-03-CA-754-SS, 2006 WL 1544621, at *9-11 (W.D. 
Tex. May 31, 2006). 




64 Id.  
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disqualification at the beginning of proceedings.65 When the possibility of disqualification was 
raised, the disqualified attorneys noted that it was not a problem because the client was “being 
ably represented by several competent attorneys from two law firms.”66 Lastly, the Crossroads 
court did not rely on any standard set forth by the Federal Circuit in reaching its conclusion.67 
c. Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Nat’l Castings, Inc. 
In the case of Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Nat’l Castings, Inc., the court disqualified an 
opinion-drafting attorney based on the “totality of the circumstances” standard set forth by the 
Federal Circuit.68 In Amsted, the court held that by invoking the defense of reliance on advice of 
counsel, the defendant placed the circumstances surrounding the drafting of the opinion letter 
into question and that the defendant had waived the attorney-client privilege.69 Of particular 
relevance was that the plaintiff alleged that the defendant intentionally withheld information 
from the opinion-drafting attorney when the attorney drafted the opinion and, therefore, any 
reliance on the opinion was likely unreasonable.70 The court noted that it was necessary for the 
attorney to testify, and not a representative of the client itself, because the attorney was in the 
best position to know what information he considered, what information was material to his non-
infringement opinion, and whether any information not provided to him would have been 
material to the conclusions which he reached.71 The Amsted court lastly noted that there would 
be little or no hardships placed upon the client since multiple law firms represented the client.72   
                                                 
65 Id. at 11 
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 9-11. 
68 Amsted Indus., Inc. v. Nat’l Castings, Inc., 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1737, 1742 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (citing Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. 
GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1109-10 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
69 Id. at 1743. 
70 Id. at 1741-43. 
71 Id. at 1743. 
72 Id.  
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d. Cases Holding that Disqualification Was Proper Are Arguably Incorrect 
Even Under the Underwater Devices Standard 
 
It is arguable that requiring an opinion-drafting attorney to testify about his 
“qualifications and objectivity,” his “credibility and legal acumen,” the “accuracy and validity of 
the opinions” and the information material to his opinion was improper, even under the 
Underwater Devices totality of the circumstances standard. The extensive list of nine factors 
outlined by the Federal Circuit to determine whether an infringer acted willfully does not include 
the credibility of the opinion-drafting attorney, the basis for the attorney’s opinion, or the 
accuracy or validity of the opinion itself.73 Rather, the Federal Circuit listed as a relevant factor: 
“(2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other's patent protection, investigated the scope 
of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed.”74 The 
Federal Circuit has even stated that “[w]hile an opinion of counsel letter is an important factor in 
determining the willfulness of infringement, its importance does not depend upon its legal 
correctness. . . . Rather, counsel's opinion must be thorough enough, as combined with other 
factors, to instill a belief in the infringer that a court might reasonably hold the patent is invalid, 
not infringed, or unenforceable.”75 In Underwater Devices the Federal Circuit held that the client 
did not act in good faith because it relied on an opinion-drafting attorney who was in-house 
counsel, was not a patent attorney, did not examine the file history of the patent, and did not 
                                                 
73 Once again, the nine factors considered relevant by the federal circuit are: “(1) whether the infringer deliberately 
copied the ideas or design of another; (2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other's patent protection, 
investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed; (3) 
the infringer's behavior as a party to the litigation; (4) defendant's size and financial condition; (5) closeness of the 
case; (6) duration of defendant's misconduct; (7) remedial action by the defendant; (8) defendant's motivation for 
harm; (9) whether defendant attempted to conceal its misconduct.” Read Corp. 970 F.2d at 826-27 (citations 
omitted).  
74 Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d at 826-27 (emphasis added). 
75 Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). 
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engage in an analysis that a patent attorney would have.76 All of these facts were apparent from 
the opinion letter itself and the attorney was not required as a witness.77  
These factors show that the Federal Circuit is not concerned with the conduct or 
qualifications of the opinion-drafting attorney, but rather, is concerned with whether the infringer 
formed a “good-faith belief” that its activity was non-infringing based upon the legal advice it 
received.  The relevant inquiry is not whether the attorney was qualified, credible, or provided an 
accurate and valid opinion, but rather, whether the client believed in good faith that the attorney 
was qualified, credible, and provided an accurate and valid opinion. As noted by the Bristol-
Myers and Liqui-Box courts, a client’s good faith reliance on an opinion letter could be 
established by considering factors such as “whether counsel examined the file history of the 
patents, whether the opinion came from in-house or outside counsel, whether there was a pattern 
of attorney shopping by the alleged infringer, and whether the opinion came from a patent 
attorney”78 or “the opinion letter should be reviewed for its overall tone, its discussion of case 
law, its analysis of the particular facts and its reference to inequitable conduct [by the patent 
holder’s attorney].”79 Any inquiry into what the attorney believed when he formed his opinion, 
why he formed his opinion, or what information he considered would be irrelevant to whether 
the client acted in good faith because the client would not have had any knowledge of this 
information when they received the opinion.  Clients are likely to presume that an attorney would 
provide them with all relevant information and analysis in a legal opinion letter. Of course, 
clients cannot blindly rely on every single opinion letter they receive. If the opinion letter was 
grossly lacking factual information or did not engage in a serious analysis then that opinion 
                                                 
76 Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1390. 
77 Id.  
78 Liqui-Box, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1075. 
79 Ristvedt-Johnson, Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., 1990 WL 114732, at *3 (citing Westvaco Corp. v. Int’l Paper, 991 F.2d 
735, 743-44 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
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could not provide the client with a good faith belief that their ensuing conduct would not 
constitute infringement.  
Even if an opinion letter was seriously deficient, however, it would be irrelevant why the 
opinion lacked the factual information or legal analysis required to form a valid opinion. The 
attorney would not be required to testify about facts that are exclusively in his knowledge 
because those facts could not have been a part of the infringer’s decision to engage in infringing 
activity. The result is that the opinion-drafting attorney is not a necessary witness and ought not 
to be called as a witness because the client would be in the best position of testifying about its 
own decisions regarding why it relied on a legal opinion that was either lacking relevant factual 
information or legal analysis.         
The Rohm and Crossroad courts did not rely on the Underwater Devices standard, nor 
any other circuit’s standard, in disqualifying the opinion-drafting attorneys.80 Rather, these courts 
stated in conclusive terms, without any analysis, that the attorneys were necessary to testify 
about their knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the forming of their opinion.81 These 
courts’ failure to focus their inquiry to the beliefs of the infringer led to the improper 
disqualification of the opinion-drafting attorneys. Similarly, while the Amsted court did rely on 
the Federal Circuit’s willful infringement standard, it concluded that the attorney was 
nevertheless disqualified because he was required to testify about the client’s withholding of 
information.82 Again, the proper inquiry under Underwater Devices, however, is what the 
infringer believed or knew, not the attorney.83 Therefore, it would not be proper for the attorney 
to testify about whether or not he received certain information. Rather, the client would be in the 
                                                 
80 See generally Rohm & Haas Co., 1999 WL 718114, at *1; Crossroad Sys., 2006 WL 1544621, at *9-11. 
81 Id.  
82 Amsted Indus., 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1742. 
83 Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d at 826-27. 
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best position to testify because they would be required to testify about what information they 
withheld and further testify about their reasoning for withholding the information.  
Nevertheless, the Rohm, Crossroad, and Amsted courts all believed that it was necessary 
for the opinion-drafting attorneys to testify about his credibility, qualifications, or basis of his 
opinion to determine whether their clients willfully infringed.84 As previously stated, the Federal 
Circuit overruled Underwater Devices and created a new standard for willful infringement. This 
new standard provides courts with the opportunity to form a uniform rule regarding the 
disqualification of opinion-drafting attorneys.   
B. Other Cases Involving Advice of Counsel Defenses 
 
Willfulness is often an element to a criminal offense. As such, the “advice of counsel” 
defense is available to refute charges that a defendant willfully engaged in unlawful activity and 
presents a factually analogous scenario to the current situation.85 Whether or not a court will 
disqualify an attorney varies widely depending on the specific factual scenarios of each case.86 In 
criminal cases, however, courts often find that an attorney is a necessary witness when the 
defendant raises the advice of counsel defense.87 Civil cases vary widely depending on the 
involvement and knowledge of an attorney in activities prior to litigation.88  
  
                                                 
84 See generally Rohm & Haas Co., 1999 WL 718114, at *1; Crossroad Sys., 2006 WL 1544621, at *9-11; Amsted 
Indus., 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1742. 
85 See U.S. v. Gouaz, No. 03-20248-CR-ALTONAGA, 2003 WL 22862653, at *1-2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2003); U.S. v. 
Locascio, 357 F. Supp. 2d 536, 554 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).  
86 Locascio, 357 F. Supp. at 554. 
87 Gouaz, 2003 WL 22862653, at *1-2; Locascio, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 554. 
88 See Sea Tow Int’l, Inc. v. Pontin, No. CV-06-3461 (SJF)(ETB), 2007 WL 4180679, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 
2007) (citing cases that find disqualification proper where an attorney “negotiates, executes, and administers a 
contract” and cases that find disqualification improper when “a lawyer plays no role in the negotiation or drafting of 
the contract at issue”); FDIC v. Isham, 782 F. Supp. 524, 527-28 (D. Colo. 1992) (bank directors who relied on 
advice of attorney needed attorney to testify and therefore the attorney could not represent a co-defendant); Miller v. 
Colo. Farms, No. CIV. A. 97WY2015WD, 2001 WL 629463, at *4 (D. Colo. Jan. 16, 2001) (finding that attorney 
who provided oral advice to defendant prior to slander lawsuit was necessary to testify about “his communications 
[with the client], about the advice [he] provided, and [the client’s] reliance upon the advice”). 
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a. U.S. v. Gouaz 
In U.S. v. Gouaz, the defendant was charged with theft of government property when he 
received $25,000 in IRS monies (which were supposed to be paid as taxes) as part of a money- 
laundering scheme but failed to forward the $25,000 to his conspirator.89 The defendant raised 
the defense that he received advice from his attorney not to forward the funds because this would 
constitute money laundering and, therefore, the defendant did not have the required intent to steal 
the funds from the IRS.90 The court ultimately held that the attorney who provided the advice 
should be disqualified from representing the defendant at trial because the attorney would be a 
necessary witness.91 In reaching this conclusion the court noted that the government has the 
burden of proof and must be able rebut the defendant’s claim that he relied on advice of 
counsel.92 The court further noted that the attorney was the only witness, other than the 
defendant, that had knowledge of the conversation which allegedly negated the willful intent.93 
In conclusion, the court stated that “it is inconceivable that the defendant’s right to a particular 
counsel should be permitted to impose . . . artificial advantages upon the government.”94  
b. U.S. v. Locascio 
In U.S. v. Locascio, the government moved to disqualify an attorney who was defending 
a member of the “Gambino Family of La Cosa Nostra” against charges for deceptive advertising 
as part of a larger RICO prosecution.95 The government contends that the defendant engaged in a 
deceptive advertising scheme to obtain credit card numbers to bill customers for unwanted phone 
                                                 
89 Gouaz, 2003 WL 22862653, at *1. 
90 Id.  
91 Id. at *5. 
92 Id. at *2, *4. 
93 Id. at *4.  
94 Id. at *4 (quoting U.S. v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1151, 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).  
95 U.S. v. Locascio, 357 F. Supp. 2d 536, 539 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).  
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and Internet services.96 Since the defendant had prior mail fraud convictions, he sought “an 
attorney [to] review and approve the advertisements [to] protect them from prosecution in the 
future.”97 The defendant first received advice from Ms. Jaffe and later received advice from Mr. 
Dichter.98 In defense to the deceptive advertising charges, the defendant claimed that he “had no 
intent to mislead consumers in his advertisements since they had been reviewed by [Mr. Dichter] 
for compliance with, among other regulations, the Federal Trade Commission’s clear and 
conspicuous disclosure standard.”99 An attorney in Ms. Jaffe’s firm was now representing 
Chanes and the government sought to disqualify him since Ms. Jaffe would be a necessary 
witness.100 The court ultimately concluded that Ms. Jaffe was in fact a necessary witness because 
there was strong evidence that Mr. Dicther’s advice was “plainly wrong.”101 There was also 
evidence that Ms. Jaffe was a competent attorney and had advised the defendant regarding FTC 
deceptive advertising standards.102 As such, Ms. Jaffe was the only witness who could rebut the 
defendant’s claim of reliance on advice of counsel, and her associate was disqualified from 
representing the defendant.103  
c. Advice of Counsel Defense for Willful Infringement is Unique to Patent Law 
The advice of counsel defense in criminal contexts is different from the current situation 
for two important reasons.  First, the burden of proof is on the government to prove willfulness 
in criminal cases.  As was stated by Gouaz, the government would be severely disadvantaged if it 
were required to accept the defendant’s claim of reliance on advice of counsel. By contrast, in 
the current situation the burden of proof is on the alleged infringer to prove that they acted 
                                                 
96 Id. at 547. 
97 Id.  
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 548.  
100 Id. at 547.  
101 Id. at 554. 
102 Id. at 554-55. 
103 Id. at 555.  
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reasonably to refute a claim of willful infringement. Second, the advice given by the attorney in 
the defendant in patent infringement cases is often a corporation as opposed to individuals in 
criminal cases. Since a criminal defendant is an individual and faces imprisonment, as the case 
was in Locascio, the defendant will have a strong incentive to raise any defense which would 
prevent them from going being incarcerated. Therefore, the government must be able to present 
any evidence that may contradict mere allegations, including testimony by an attorney who 
provided advice to the defendant. By contrast, individuals testifying on behalf of a corporation 
will most likely not have personal interests at stake. Moreover, most corporations will have a 
policy of retaining written non-infringement opinions. The result is that a person testifying on 
behalf of a corporation will be more trustworthy and their testimony must corroborate with the 
written opinion retained by the corporation. As such, there is not as strong of a need to have an 
opinion-drafting attorney testify at trial as there is in a criminal case.    
 In conclusion, there are not many cases outside the area of patent law that can provide 
guidance on whether to disqualify opinion-drafting attorneys. Courts have noted that the 
enhanced damages for willful infringement is unique to patent law.104 As such, the Federal 
Circuit’s recent opinions regarding the substantive elements of willful infringement are 
instructive with respect to disqualification of an opinion-drafting attorney.    
C. The Federal Circuit’s New Willful Infringement Standard Under In Re Seagate 
 
In 2007, the Federal Circuit overruled Underwater Devices and re-defined the standard 
for willful infringement.105 The court overruled Underwater Devices based upon the recent 
                                                 
104 Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. E’Lite Optik, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1092 (D. Nev. 2003) (“the defense of reliance on 
advice of counsel to an allegation of willful infringement is an issue that appears unique to patent litigation”); 
Steelcase, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (“Questions involving the scope of 
waiver of the attorney-client privilege in patent cases where willful infringement is an issue would appear to be 
unique to patent litigation”). 
105 Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. 
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Supreme Court case of Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr.106 The Supreme Court in Safeco stated 
that the “standard civil usage” of “willful” includes reckless behavior.107 The Supreme Court has 
defined a reckless person as “[one] who acts . . . in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm 
that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.”108 By contrast, the affirmative duty 
to obtain a non-infringement opinion and an examination of a totality of the circumstances, as 
required by Underwater Devices, was more akin to a negligence standard and was therefore in 
error.109 As such, the Federal Circuit held that “proof of willful infringement permitting 
enhanced damages requires at least a showing of objective recklessness” and that there is no 
longer an affirmative obligation to seek an opinion from counsel.110  
The Federal Circuit developed a standard in which a showing of recklessness is a two-
part analysis.111 First, “a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer 
acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid 
patent.”112 The Federal Circuit noted that “[t]he state of mind of the accused infringer is not 
relevant to this objective inquiry.”113 Second, “[i]f this threshold objective standard is satisfied, 
the patentee must also demonstrate that this objectively-defined risk . . . was either known or so 
obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer.”114 The court explicitly left the 
application and development of this standard to future cases since it was only determining the 
willfulness standard as a preliminary matter to the extent of waiver of the attorney-client 
                                                 
106 Id. at 1370 (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, __ U.S. __; 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007)).  
107 Id. at 1370-71 (citing Safeco, 127 S. Ct. at 2209).   
108 Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)).  
109 Id. at 1371.   
110 Id. 
111 Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371 
112 Id. 
113 Id.  
114 Id. 
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privilege when a defendant raises the advice of counsel defense.115 The Federal Circuit or any 
other court has yet to apply this standard in determining whether to disqualify an opinion-
drafting attorney. It appears that the opinion letter will play an important role in examining both 
steps of the new willful infringement standard. Applying the facts from the cases discussed 
above following Underwater Devices will be helpful in predicting how this new standard will be 
applied with respect to disqualification of opinion-drafting attorneys.   
1. Opinion Letters Will Likely Examine the Same Considerations In Determining 
Whether an Objectively High Risk Existed 
 
The first prong of the Seagate standard requires an analysis to determine whether “the 
infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of 
a valid patent.”116 Thus, the Seagate court has imposed an objective standard upon the willful 
infringement analysis.117 Black’s dictionary defines “objective” as “[o]f, relating to, or based on 
externally verifiable phenomena, as opposed to an individual's perceptions, feelings, or 
intentions.”118 Black’s further defines “objective standard” as “[a] legal standard that is based on 
conduct and perceptions external to a particular person.”119 The Seagate court has therefore 
created a standard in which the state of mind of the infringer is initially entirely irrelevant to the 
determination of willfulness.  
Since the state of mind of the infringer is entirely irrelevant to the first prong, the state of 
mind and conclusions of the opinion-drafting attorney are also likely to be irrelevant. The result 
is that the fact that an opinion letter was obtained will not likely be a major factor in determining 
whether there was an objectively high risk of infringement. The considerations within the 
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opinion letter, however, are likely to be the same factors to determine whether there was an 
objectively high risk. In short, the opinion letter itself would not be an objective indication of a 
high risk or lack thereof, but the contents of the opinion letter are likely to be the same 
considerations that will prove or disprove an objectively high risk. Therefore, clients will be able 
to take solace in the fact that an attorney, after engaging in a thorough review and analysis, has 
provided them with a non-infringement opinion.      
The cases explicitly following the Underwater Devices standard, and finding 
disqualification improper, did so from an objective viewpoint and are instructive.120 These cases 
stated that the proper inquiry into an opinion letter was whether it “appears to be competent,”121 
that the opinion letter should be examined by the “four corners of the document,”122 and that the 
proper inquiry was “whether an opinion on validity or infringement was sought and offered 
rather than the correctness of the opinion itself.”123 It is not surprising then that the Liqui-Box 
court only considered the opinion for factors such as “whether counsel examined the file history 
of the patents, whether the opinion came from in-house or outside counsel . . . and whether the 
opinion came from a patent attorney.”124 Similarly, the Ristvedt-Johnson court stated that “the 
opinion letter should be reviewed for its overall tone, its discussion of case law, its analysis of 
the particular facts and its reference to inequitable conduct [by the patent holder’s attorney].”125 
These factors are all objective factors that can be determined by examining the “four corners” of 
the document.   
                                                 
120 See generally  Bristol-Myers, 2000 WL 1655054, at *2-4; Liqui-Box, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1075; Ristvedt-Johnson. 
1990 WL 114732, at *3;  
121 Bristol-Myers, 2000 WL 1655054, at *2 (emphasis added). 
122 Liqui-Box, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1075. 
123 Ristvedt-Johnson, 1990 WL 114732, at *3. 
124 Liqui-Box, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1075. 
125 Ristvedt-Johnson, Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., 1990 WL 114732, at *3 (citing Westvaco Corp. v. Int’l Paper, 991 F.2d 
735, 743-44 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
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By objectively examining a non-infringement opinion, without any further testimony 
from the opinion-drafting attorney, courts will be able to conclude whether reliance on the 
opinion would tend to prove or disprove willful infringement. If an opinion were written by a 
non-patent attorney, and this was apparent to the infringer, then this would tend to show that the 
infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that his actions would constitute 
infringement. If the opinion that was provided to the infringer were grossly inadequate in that it 
only made conclusory statements without analysis this would also tend to prove that the infringer 
acted despite an objectively high likelihood that his actions would constitute infringement. If, on 
the other hand, the opinion was drafted by a known patent attorney, cited legal precedent, 
engaged in a thoughtful and thorough analysis, included all relevant information provided by the 
infringer, and reached a conclusion after balancing facts for an against the client, this would tend 
to show that there was not an objectively high likelihood of infringement because reasonable 
men would be able to differ about whether the actions constituted infringement or not.  In any 
event, the drafting attorney will not be necessary to testify about how the opinion objectively 
appeared to the infringer. 
2. If the Objectively High Risk is Shown, the Infringer’s Knowledge of the Risk 
Will Likely Be Affected By the Opinion  
 
The second prong requires that “[i]f this threshold objective standard is satisfied, the 
patentee must also demonstrate that this objectively-defined risk . . . was either known or so 
obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer.”126 This is consistent with 
Federal Circuit’s previous analysis following Underwater Devices into “whether the infringer, 
when he knew of the other's patent protection, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a 
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good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed.”127 In Seagate, the Federal 
Circuit has reiterated that the proper inquiry is into the knowledge of the infringer and precludes 
inquiry into the knowledge of the attorney or any other third party.   
If the Rohm, Crossroads, and Amsted courts were to address their cases under the second 
prong of the Seagate willful infringement standard, it is likely that these courts would have 
reached a different conclusion and would not have disqualified the opinion-drafting attorneys. In 
those cases the attorneys were disqualified based upon inquiries into their “qualifications and 
objectivity,”128 “credibility and legal acumen,”129 or knowledge of relevant facts.130 The second 
prong of this new standard clearly limits the inquiry into whether the accused infringer knew, or 
should have known, that their activity would be infringing. The opinion-drafting attorney will 
not be able to provide any testimony that the infringer could not provide since the infringer’s 
beliefs regarding whether its actions were infringing could only be formed upon the information 
and analysis that the attorney communicated to them, either in an opinion letter or any other 
communication.   
An opinion letter can show that the risk was known if the attorney gives the opinion that 
conduct would be infringing. Alternatively, the opinion letter may also show that the infringer 
should have known of the infringing activity based upon the inadequacy of the opinion. The same 
objective factors for evaluating an opinion, as discussed above, will also be indicative of whether 
an infringer should have known their conduct was infringing. If an opinion were grossly 
inadequate then the client should either request a further inquiry with the same attorney or seek a 
second opinion from another attorney that would engage in a more thorough analysis. Relying on 
                                                 
127 Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d at 826-27 (emphasis added). 
128 Rohm & Haas Co. v. Lonza, Inc., 1999 WL 718114, at *1. 
129 Crossroad Sys. (Texas), 2006 WL 1544621, at *9-11. 
130 Amsted Indus., 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1741-42. 
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an inadequate (not inaccurate) opinion would constitute reckless behavior. By contrast, if a client 
relies on a non-infringement opinion that is thorough and complete their behavior would not be 
reckless. Clients should be able to reasonably rely on information that is communicated to them 
by their attorneys.   
Since the contents of non-infringement opinions will analyze the same factors that tend 
show whether there was an objectively high risk, and since clients should be able to rely on 
thorough non-infringement opinions, an opinion-drafting attorney will not provide any evidence 
that is material to determining whether a client engaged in willful infringement.   
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT LIMITED WAIVER OF ATTORNEY WORK-
PRODUCT IN ADVICE OF COUNSEL DEFENSES SO ATTORNEY CAN 
ONLY TESTIFY ABOUT INFORMAITON THAT IS OBTAINABLE 
THROUGH OTHER SOURCES 
 
Even if a court determines that an opinion-drafting attorney can testify to material 
evidence, that attorney is still likely not a necessary witness because the same information that 
the attorney will testify to is available through other sources, most notably the client who 
received the opinion letter. Any relevant information that the opinion-drafting attorney has, that 
the client does not have, will be protected by the attorney work product doctrine.   
In Echostar the defendant raised the advice of counsel defense to refute a claim of willful 
infringement.131 The Federal Circuit reaffirmed that by raising the advice of counsel defense the 
client waived the attorney-client privilege.132 The court stated, “waiver applies to all other 
communications relating to the same subject matter.”133 Prior to Echostar, district courts differed 
about whether the waiver also applied to attorney work product that was never communicated to 
                                                 
131 In re Echostar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1298-99 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
132 Id. at 1300-01. 
133 Id.  
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the client.134 Several district courts concluded that the waiver covered documents never disclosed 
to the client because this would be a means of limiting the advice of counsel defense to 
“infringers who prudently and sincerely sought competent advice from competent counsel.”135 
Moreover, these district courts relied on the fact that “if negative information was important 
enough to reduce to a memorandum, there is a reasonable possibility that the information was 
conveyed in some form or fashion to the client.”136 Lastly, the courts were concerned that parties 
would assert the work product protections for unfavorable information while waiving the 
protections for favorable information.137 The Echostar court ultimately concluded that these 
district courts were incorrect and held that waiver does not extend to work product that was 
never disclosed to the client.138 
In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit noted that work-product waiver only 
extends to “factual” or “non-opinion” work product as opposed to work-product that reflects an 
“attorney’s own analysis and debate over what advice will be given.”139 This heightened 
protection for opinion work-product is recognized “because it promotes a fair and efficient 
adversarial system by protecting ‘the attorney’s thought processes and legal recommendations’ 
from the prying eyes of his or her opponent.”140 As was stated in Seagate, “mental process work 
product is afforded even greater, nearly absolute, protection.”141 In limiting the waiver of the 
work product protections only to documents actually communicated to the client and factual 
work product, the court reasoned that “if a legal opinion or mental impression was never 
communicated to the client, then it provides little if any assistance to the court in determining 
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whether the accused knew it was infringing, and any relative value is outweighed by the policies 
supporting the work-product doctrine.”142 Thus, the scope of discovery when an advice of 
counsel defense is raised is limited.  The effect of this holding is that opposing parties can only 
require disclosure of information and attorney work product that was communicated between to 
the client.  This necessarily means that another witness will be able to testify about the 
information that the attorney would have knowledge about.   
The District Court in Amsted held that the attorney was a necessary witness because it 
was necessary for the attorney to testify, and not a representative of the client itself, because the 
attorney was in the best position to know what information he considered, what information was 
material to his non-infringement opinion, and whether any information not provided to him 
would have been material to the conclusions which he reached.143 This inquiry, however, appears 
to be limited by the recent holding of Echostar. The Echostar court noted that the “[w]ork 
product waiver extends only so far as to inform the court of the infringer’s state of mind,” so it is 
irrelevant to inquire into what the attorney believed, unless this information was actually 
communicated to the client.144 The Echostar court then stated, “It is important what the alleged 
infringer knew or believed, and by contradistinction not what other items counsel may have 
prepared but did not communicate to the client, that informs the court of an infringer’s 
willfulness.”145 Once again, the result is that an opinion-drafting attorney is not a necessary 
witness.   
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Since courts have generally held that an attorney is a necessary witness or ought to be 
called as a witness if that attorney “[1] will give evidence material to the determination of the 
issues being litigated, [2] that the evidence is unobtainable elsewhere, and [3] that the testimony 
is or may be prejudicial to the testifying attorney's client,” opinion-drafting attorneys are not 
necessary witnesses.146 Opinion-drafting attorneys will not testify about evidence material to the 
determination of willful infringement because willful infringement (under both the Underwater 
Devices and Seagate standards) examines what the infringer believed at the time it engaged in its 
infringing activity. Moreover, since the waiver of work product protection is limited to 
information and documents actually communicated to the client, the information being sought 
will almost always be obtainable from another source. In conclusion, attorneys who provide non-
infringement or invalidity opinions are not necessary witnesses absent exceptional 
circumstances.   
 
 
   
                                                 
146 Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Int’l Ins. Co., 881 P.2d 1020, 1033 (Wash. 1994) (discussing R. 3.7); accord 
Personalized Mass Media Corp. v. Weather Channel, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 239, 243 (E.D. Va. 1995) (discussing DR 5-
102; Cottonwood Estates, Inc. v. Paradise Builders, Inc., 624 P.2d 296, 302 (Ariz. 1981) (discussing DR 5-102). 
